Nahmod Law

The Rooker-Feldman Background

In the circuits, despite the broad jurisdictional grants of 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343 over section 1983 claims, there are circumstances where federal jurisdiction is thought to be absent. Thus, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (named after two Supreme Court cases), as subsequently elaborated by the Court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005). federal courts have no subject matter (or appellate) jurisdiction over state court judgments in connection with modifying or vacating them. In other words, plaintiffs who are state court losers cannot use section 1983 claims brought in federal court to try to challenge adverse state court decisions directly. That is what state appellate courts are for.

For Rooker-Feldman to apply, then, there must be a state court judgment. Rooker-Feldman does not apply, though, to oust federal courts of jurisdiction where an unreviewed administrative order is involved. This is so even where the administrative agency acted in an adjudicative capacity or where the plaintiff could have sought review, but did not, of the agency’s decision in state court.

Exxon-Mobil Corp. and the Court’s Attempt to Explain the Proper Scope of Rooker-Feldman

In Exxon Mobil Corp., a unanimous 2005 decision, the Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsburg, observed that Rooker-Feldman “has sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 1738.” After extensive analysis of the doctrine, the Court then declared:

            “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.”           

The Court in Exxon Mobil went on to emphasize that when there is parallel state and federal litigation, as in the case before it, Rooker-Feldman was not triggered just by the entry of judgment in the state court proceeding. Rather, preclusion law would then be applicable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Third Circuit which had ruled in erroneous reliance on Rooker-Feldman that the district court’s jurisdiction terminated once the state court entered judgment. The Court pointed out that the litigant in the federal action was not seeking to overturn the state court judgment.

Rooker-Feldman turns out to be quite a complicated and arcane doctrine, as you see. I cover it extensively, and collect many circuit court cases, in §§ 1:25-1:30 of my Treatise, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 (2025-26 ed.)(West/Westlaw).

Does Rooker-Feldman apply where a state court decision is not final but is being appealed within the state court system? That is the question currently pending before the Supreme Court.

Certiorari Granted in T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Fourth Circuit case, T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System, 139 F.4^th 344 (4^th Cir. 2025), cert granted, 147 S. Ct.— (12-5-25)(No. 25-197), to deal with the following Question Presented: “Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.”

In this case, a patient and her parents sought to invalidate a state court’s consent order basing her release from involuntary commitment on compliance with certain conditions. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court correctly dismissed this section 1983 complaint under Rooker-Feldman, pointing out that the case “bears an uncanny resemblance to Rooker” which similarly sought to undo a state court judgment.

According to the Fourth Circuit, it did not matter that this case involved a consent order which was itself challenged as unconstitutional; the plaintiff was still a state court loser. And even though plaintiff had won in one state court, that case did not involve the court order that plaintiff now argued was unconstitutional.

Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Rooker-Feldman should not apply here because there was no final state court judgment. The court explained: “[W] agree with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits that Rooker-Feldman is not limited to situations when a federal court plaintiff no longer has any recourse within the state system.” There was no “stealth fifth requirement for invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”

Prediction

My prediction is that the Court will affirm the Fourth Circuit and attempt once again, as it did in Exxon-Mobil over twenty years ago, to clarify the scope of Rooker-Feldman. Whether it will succeed this time remains to be seen.

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