Nahmod Law

Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff with a § 1983 damages claim has an existing prior conviction or sentence, and where success on the § 1983 damages claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction or sentence, the claim does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise eliminated. As discussed extensively in Chapter 9 in my Treatise, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 (West/Westlaw)(2025-26 ed.) Heck has spawned a great deal of complicated litigation dealing with its scope and applicability. I’ve observed in my § 1983 presentations to attorneys that Heck has become Hell. But what follows turns out to be an easy case.

Olivier v. City of Brandon

Suppose a § 1983 plaintiff—a “street preacher” who was previously convicted of violating a city ordinance regulating speech near a public amphitheater–now wants to engage in similar conduct without the threat of criminal prosecution. So he files a suit under § 1983 and the First Amendment against the city challenging the constitutionality of that ordinance and seeking forward-looking prospective relief only. Does Heck apply? In Olivier v. City of Brandon,[1] Justice Kagan wrote for a unanimous Court: “The answer is no. Heck prohibits the use of § 1983 to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence so as to obtain release from custody or monetary damages. That decision has no bearing on [plaintiff’s] suit seeking a prospective remedy.”

In Olivier, the plaintiff had pleaded no contest five years earlier to violating the ordinance and had received one year of probation and paid a fine. His current § 1983 First Amendment suit sought only prospective relief, not the reversal of his prior conviction and not compensation for it. In addition, the plaintiff did not plan to use a favorable judgment subsequently to collaterally attack that conviction or its effects.

The district court accepted the city’s argument that Heck applied, thereby barring plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, because a favorable decision would cast doubt on the earlier conviction. The district court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Heck did not apply to a § 1983 suit for prospective relief that was unrelated to a prior conviction. The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court, but the Court reversed.

The Unanimous Decision

The Court pointed to its precedent making clear that that there was a long-established distinction between Heck-type claims and those seeking “wholly” forward-looking relief. It was not dispositive for Heck purposes that if the plaintiff succeeded in his § 1983 suit, that would somehow suggest or indicate that his prior conviction was unconstitutional. There was no real “looking back” in the plaintiff’s suit here, unlike in true Heck situations. Moreover, if another hypothetical plaintiff (call him Jones) without a conviction were to challenge the ordinance on identical First Amendment grounds, surely the suit by Jones could proceed under § 1983 even if Jones’s success in that suit would in a sense imply the invalidity of the Olivier plaintiff’s conviction. For these reasons, Heck did not apply in this case and the plaintiff could sue under § 1983 to prevent future enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional ordinance.

Comment

Olivier is an easy case which the Court used to push back against the unwarranted expansion of Heck to situations where its rationale simply does not apply.