Archive for the ‘Teaching’ Category
On September 28, 2016, I audio-taped a 55-minute makeup class on Congressional abrogation of 11th Amendment immunity, including Kimel, Garrett and Hibbs. The class concluded with an important treaty power case, Missouri v. Holland.
I hope you find it of interest.
Here it is:
listen online (no video content):
- or download file here
This Part IV in the All My Posts Series to 10-12-15 is by far the shortest.
Part I, dealing with Section 1983; Part II, dealing with Constitutional Law; and Part III, dealing with the First Amendment, were also posted today.
The topics within this post are self-explanatory.
PART IV: EDUCATION
The Adverse Effects of Laptops in the Socratic classroom
I blogged quite some time ago about the adverse effects of student laptop use in the Socratic classroom. The issue arose again recently when a colleague became concerned about this problem and asked the rest of the faculty for their thoughts and experiences.
I. Here is how I responded initially in an email:
“Bravo! It’s getting worse and worse: passive students taking
dictation, no eye contact, and even a half dozen of my con law
students continuing to type while engaged in conversation with me this
past semester. Unbelievable! Virtually impossible to have discussion
and any kind of classroom analysis.
“Please check out my blog post on laptops ( search “laptops”) from
several years ago and feel free to contact me privately about my
experiences with laptop bans.
“Good luck. If you do it, there will be pushback from all quarters.”
There were various responses. One was that laptops are ubiquitous and professors just had to adjust. Another was that banning laptops sends an anti-technology message. Another, especially concerned with internet use during classes, proposed certain rules about such use.
II. Here is how I responded to these arguments in a subsequent email.
1. You are not anti-technology just because you are seriously concerned with the adverse effects of laptops in the Socratic classroom. The message we should really be sending is that the education of our students is paramount.
2. If you primarily use the lecture method, then you have no problem with a sea of students taking dictation. If you use the discussion method, then you may.
3. There may be a split on the faculty about educational philosophy. My guess is that if you believe that students should decide whether and to what extent to participate in their education, that’s their decision. A kind of laissez faire approach. If you believe that the discussion method is perhaps the best way for students to learn how to think, and you also believe that professors know better than students about pedagogy and effective learning, then you may decide that limiting laptops makes some sense. A kind of interventionist approach.
4. The misuse of laptops hurts the better students because the classroom discussions are lacking. It hurts the poor students by reinforcing their poor learning habit of passivity. The research that I’ve looked at (admittedly casually) supports these observations.
5. One possible way around these problems is to do what I am told is done at Yale. One student per class meeting is assigned the role of taking dictation and distributing the notes to classmates. The student is chosen either by other students or by the professor from volunteers on a rotating basis.”
III. Academic freedom and bottom-up decision-making
The Deep Dive features both text and video explanations (including a short video by me on section 1983 Fourth Amendment claims), and is geared to lawyers, law students and the public at large.
The Deep Dive can in fact serve as a primer for those unfamiliar with the Fourth Amendment.
Check it out here:
You’re invited to follow me on Twitter @NahmodLaw.
This is another in a series of posts written about the Constitution in everyday language, with a minimum of legal jargon. Previous posts introduced the Constitution, rebutted some commonly held myths about the Constitution, addressed the Equal Protection Clause, considered free speech and hate speech and discussed procedural due process.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to the federal government (“No person … shall …be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to state and local governments (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
Distinguishing Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Due Process
The immediately preceding post deals with procedural due process which focuses on fair and timely procedures.
It is far less complicated and controversial than substantive due process, the subject of this post, which focuses on government regulation of conduct such as abortion, sexual conduct and certain family matters.
One reason that substantive due process is so controversial is that it is not explicitly based in the text of the Constitution, thereby suggesting to some that the Supreme Court has acted improperly and has simply (or not so simply) made it up.
The History of Substantive Due Process: Economic Regulation/Family
The term “substantive due process” is a bit of an oxymoron since “due process” suggests procedure in contrast to substance. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, beginning in the late 19th century and ending in the mid-1930’s, used substantive due process to strike down many state regulations dealing with economic matters such as employment relationships, work conditions and other attempts to regulate business interests.
Interestingly, perhaps the first use of substantive due process by the Supreme Court was in the infamous Dred Scott case in antebellum America. Here, the Court held that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because it took away the property of slaveholders and thus violated substantive due process.
Even though substantive due process was typically identified with economic regulation, there was an important component that dealt with liberty in family matters. For example, in the 1920’s the Supreme Court ruled (in Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters) that states violated substantive due process when they prohibited parents from arranging to have their children learn the German language and also when they required all children to attend a public school while prohibiting them from attending religious private schools. These decisions thus address the non-economic, family related liberty component of substantive due process.
The Retreat from Substantive Due Process in Economic Matters
The high-water mark of substantive due process in economic regulation matters may have been reached in the early part of the 20th century in the (in)famous Lochner v. New York case. Here the Court struck down a New York statute that regulated the maximum hours that bakers could work as a violation of the liberty of contract of employers and employees to negotiate hours and working conditions in general without government interference.
But starting in the mid-1930’s, the Court retreated dramatically from intervening judicially in such matters (one aspect of what some have called “the switch in time that saved nine” in response to President Roosevelt‘s court-packing plan). Eventually the Court became incredibly deferential to state (and federal) regulation of economic matters, using in most such cases what lawyers call a “conceivable rational basis” test. In other words, so long as an economic regulation could be considered to have a rational basis, it did not violate substantive due process.
Current Substantive Due Process/Privacy Doctrine
Even though meaningful substantive due process review is now effectively dead in economic regulation matters, it has survived and subsequently thrived as applied to liberty in family and sexual matters.
There were hints of what was to come in Skinner v. Oklahoma, a 1942 equal protection decision that struck down sterilization as criminal punishment. Here, Justice Douglas famously said: “Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the [human] race.” But it was only in Griswold v. Connecticut, a 1965 decision invalidating a criminal prohibition against the use of contraceptives by married persons, that the Court expressly recognized a constitutional right of marital privacy, though there remained some question of its source in the text.
Thereafter, the Court expanded this right of privacy beyond marriage to include the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy in certain circumstances, largely on family/personal autonomy grounds. Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), which modified Roe, are the leading cases so ruling on the basis of substantive due process. However, the Court in 2007 cut back somewhat on the scope of the right in Gonzalez v. Carhart, at least in cases dealing with statutes prohibiting so-called “partial birth abortions.”
Finally, in Lawrence v. Texas, a blockbuster 2003 decision, the Court held, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, that states may not criminalize intimate homosexual conduct. The ground here was expressly personal autonomy: “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”
As things now stand, Roe, as modified by Casey and Carhart, is still good law. Lawrence remains good law as well.
The hot issue regarding homosexual conduct that is currently percolating in the circuits is the substantive due process question whether the right to marry someone of your own sex is a fundamental right
protected by substantive due process.
This is the third in the series and it addresses three myths about the Supreme Court with a minimum of legal jargon.
The First Myth. The Supreme Court’s primary function is to do justice.
Reality. The Supreme Court’s primary function is to interpret the Constitution and federal statutes. These interpretations become the supreme law of the land. The Court’s function is not necessarily to do justice in individual cases.
Of course, there are times when interpretations of particular constitutional provisions are considered by many to be just. For example, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits racial and other kinds of discrimination by government, is considered to be a just constitutional provision because it is based on the concept of equality.
Another example is the due process clause and its application in criminal cases. Due process has been interpreted to include concepts of justice and fairness so as to protect the rights of criminal defendants to an unbiased court, to confrontation and cross-examination, to be free from self-incrimination, to an attorney, and so on.
What is most important to remember, though, is that Supreme Court decisions are not necessarily just or moral. A Supreme Court decision can uphold an unjust federal or state law as constitutional. For example, the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson unfortunately upheld separate but equal in the racial setting at the end of the 19th century.
On the other hand, a Supreme Court decision can rule that a wise and just federal or state law is unconstitutional. For example, the Supreme Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison at the beginning of this century. Read the rest of this entry »