Nahmod Law

The Background: The Supreme Court’s Janus Decision

Recall the Supreme Court’s blockbuster decision in Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)(Janus I), overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and holding that it now violates the First Amendment rights of union nonmembers for state and local governments, and for public employee unions, to compulsorily withhold fair-share or agency fees from those nonmembers.

Question: after Janus, do union nonmembers have viable section 1983 damages claims against the public employee unions that previously received those fair-share or agency fees, at least for the period of time permitted under the forum state’s statute of limitations?

The Seventh Circuit’s Section 1983 Janus Decision

In Janus v. AFSCME, 2019 WL 5704367 (7^th Cir. 2019)(Janus II), petition for certiorari filed, a non-union state employee sued a public employee union under §1983 and the First Amendment for damages to recover the fair-share fees he had previously paid to the union before the Supreme Court’s decision was handed down.

The Seventh Circuit first ruled that the union acted under color of law, and was thus subject to section 1983, because its receipt of fair share fees from the state pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement was attributable to the state. Here, the union was a joint participant in the agency fee arrangement because the state deducted fair share fees from employees’ paychecks and transferred that money to the union which spent it pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement on labor-management issues. The court then went on to determine that Janus I was retroactive.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the union was protected by a good faith defense. After analyzing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992), a case involving the private use of state attachment procedures, the court reasoned that the good faith defense articulated there applied here as well. It commented that it was “join[ing] its sister circuits in recognizing that, under appropriate circumstances, a private party that acts under color of law for purposes of section 1983 may defend on the ground that it proceeded in good faith.” It declared, relying on Wyatt, that the good faith defense applied to the public union because it had reasonably relied on then-established First Amendment law. The Seventh Circuit relied by analogy on the tort of abuse of process with its good faith “defense,” as well as on the “appropriateness of allowing a good-faith defense on its own terms.” Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to money damages. Judge Manion concurred, 2019 WL 5704367, *12, pointing out that public unions had received a “windfall.”

Thereafter, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits joined the Seventh Circuit in so holding. Lee v. Ohio Education Assn., 2020 881265 (6^th Cir. 2020) and Danielson v. Inslee, 2019 WL 7182203 (9^th Cir.2019).

Comment

The decision on which Janus II relied, Wyatt v. Cole, soundly held, in my opinion, that qualified immunity does not protect a private defendant who uses unconstitutional state attachment procedures that violate procedural due process. Under a functional approach, this conduct is not governmental and thus does not merit qualified immunity protection.

On the other hand, a kind of good faith defense, with both subjective (honest belief) and objective (reasonable belief) components, would be appropriate, according to various justices in Wyatt. As a matter of policy, we want private parties to rely on the law rather than act illegally. Also, it would be unfair to subject a private party who guesses wrong about the unconstitutionality of a state attachment statute to section 1983 damages liability.

This good faith defense thus differs from qualified immunity in two ways: an immediate interlocutory appeal from a district court’s denial of the good faith defense on summary judgment or on motion to dismiss is not available, and the private defendant must honestly (and reasonably) believe that he or she acted constitutionally.

Significantly, after Wyatt, the Court handed down two private party immunity decisions that are rather clearly in tension with one another. One, Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997), held in an opinion by Justice Breyer that prison guards who are employed by a private prison management firm are not protected by qualified immunity. He improperly, in my view, focused on history and marketplace incentives rather than on the government function that such private prison guards perform. They should have been protected by qualified immunity.

The other, Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012), unanimously and soundly held that a private attorney retained to work with government employees in conducting an internal affairs investigation was protected by qualified immunity. Note that the Court strained to distinguish Richardson as a “self consciously” narrow decision emphasizing the particular circumstances there.

In this light, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Janus II  appears to be correct. The challenged conduct here is not governmental in nature but still, under Wyatt, it should be protected at least by the good faith defense. Before Janus I was handed down, the law of the land was Abood and it was on this Supreme Court decision that the public employee union relied. This belief was both honest and reasonable at the time.

All of this is not to say, of course, that I support the Court’s current qualified immunity jurisprudence. I do not, as evidenced by a search of this blog for “qualified immunity” and by the analysis of qualified immunity in my treatise, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 (2019)(West/Westlaw).

In any event, since a petition for certiorari in pending in Janus II, we may shortly see whether the Supreme Court weighs in on these good faith defense issues.

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Nieves v. Bartlett: The Court’s First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest Decision

The Supreme Court handed down Nieves v. Bartlett, No. 17-1174, on May 28, 2019. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court, resolving a split in the circuits, held that probable cause is a defense to a section 1983 claim against law enforcement officers accused of arresting a person in retaliation for his or her speech. But the Court provided what it called a “narrow qualification”: because officers have such wide-ranging discretion to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests for minor criminal offenses–with the potential for abuse of First Amendment rights–probable cause is not a defense where the plaintiff presents objective evidence that he or she was arrested when other similarly situated persons not engaged in the same protected conduct were not.

In Nieves, the plaintiff was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest in the setting of “Arctic Man,” a winter sports festival held in Paxson, Alaska: “During that week, the Arctic Man campground briefly becomes one of the largest and most raucous cities in Alaska.” Criminal charges were eventually dismissed and the plaintiff thereafter filed his section 1983 complaint. The facts were disputed by the parties but the plaintiff alleged in his section 1983 claim that he was arrested in violation of the First Amendment in retaliation for failing to speak to one officer and for intervening in another officer’s discussion with an underage partygoer. The district court determined that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for interfering with an investigation and for initiating a physical confrontation with one of the officers, and thus granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that probable cause is not a defense.  The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Ninth Circuit.

The Majority Opinion by Chief Justice Roberts

Chief Justice Roberts first noted that this issue–whether probable cause is a defense to a First Amendment claim of retaliatory arrest–had been before the Court twice previously (see https://nahmodlaw.com/?s=lozman) but was not resolved on the merits. He then went on to discuss the general requirement in First Amendment retaliation cases of proof by a plaintiff of but-for causation, citing Mt. Healthy Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). He observed that in many retaliation cases, showing the causal connection between a defendant’s animus and the plaintiff’s injury is “straightforward.” But in situations involving claims of First Amendment retaliatory prosecution, the causal connection is much more attenuated, because an officer’s animus in making an arrest, for example, is not the retaliatory action itself, which is the separate act of a prosecutor in bringing charges. The related presumption of prosecutorial regularity was therefore a major reason that Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 547 U.S. 250 (2006), ruled that a plaintiff bringing a section 1983 claim of First Amendment retaliatory prosecution must allege and prove the absence of probable cause in order to proceed further or, in other words, that the decision to press charges was objectively unreasonable.

Chief Justice Roberts, admitting that the two situations–retaliatory prosecutions and retaliatory arrests–are not identical, nevertheless concluded as a matter of policy that the Hartman requirement imposed on plaintiffs in First Amendment retaliatory prosecution cases should also apply to First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases. It accepted the officers’ contention that retaliatory arrest claims involve factual complexities parallel to those involved in retaliatory prosecution claims. For one thing, police officers made split-second decisions all the time, sometimes based on what was said. For another, the Fourth Amendment is an objective inquiry and a purely subjective approach would tend to undermine Fourth Amendment precedent and might even improperly set off wide-ranging discovery into an officer’s subjective state of mind, contrary to the thrust of qualified immunity and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The Court also analogized retaliatory arrest to the common law tort of malicious prosecution, which has an absence of probable cause requirement imposed on plaintiffs.

Finally, Chief Justice Roberts, perhaps prodded by Justices Breyer and Kagan who might not otherwise have joined the opinion to create a majority, recognized that police officers have wide-ranging discretion to conduct misdemeanor arrests even for minor offenses, and could thereby abuse this discretion in violation of the First Amendment. It was therefore appropriate for a plaintiff in a First Amendment retaliation case to have the opportunity to show that, even where there was probable cause to arrest, this is not a defense where the plaintiff presents objective evidence that he or she was arrested when other similarly situated persons not engaged in the same protected conduct were not. This “narrow qualification” to its holding would protect the First Amendment adequately.

Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined the Court’s opinion, as did Justice Thomas except for Part IID and its “narrow qualification.” Justice Thomas argued that the common law was clear that probable cause defeated false imprisonment, malicious arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and so the rule should be the same in section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases.

Justice Gorsuch’s Opinion

Justice Gorsuch concurred in part and dissented in part in a thoughtful but rather conflicted opinion, observing that the presence of probable cause should not defeat a First Amendment retaliatory arrest as a matter of First Amendment doctrine. However, as a matter of section 1983 and Fourth Amendment policy, probable cause analysis is not “entirely irrelevant to the analysis.” In addition, probable cause may be relevant not only to causation but also to separation of powers and federalism. Thus, he argued that the Court should not at this time have carved out the “narrow qualification” that it did, apparently based on U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), a racial discrimination selective prosecution case. He would have simply held “as the majority does, that the absence of probable cause is not an absolute requirement of such a claim and its presence is not an absolute defense.” He would leave for another day the harder probable cause and First Amendment questions until they were properly raised before the Court.

Justices Ginsburg’s and Sotomayor’s Opinions

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. In her view, Mt. Healthy was applicable: with its burden-shift to the defendant to show that, even without the impermissible motive, the defendant would have do the same thing anyway, Mt. Healthy struck the right balance between protecting free speech and section 1983 law enforcement defendants. “In any event, I would not use this thin case to state a rule that will leave press members and others exercising First Amendment rights with little protection against police suppression of their speech.”

Justice Sotomayor dissented. She agreed with the “eight Justices” majority that probable cause alone does not “always suffice[]” to defeat a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. However, she strongly disagreed with a “slimmer majority” that a showing of probable cause defeats such a claim unless the person arrested can show that otherwise similarly situated individuals whose speech differed were not arrested (the “narrow qualification”). She commented that the majority did not really try to show how First Amendment or section 1983 doctrine supported this result. In her view, the Court should evaluate section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims in the same way they evaluate other First Amendment retaliation claims: under the Mt. Healthy burden-shift test. This test, she pointed out, is not easily satisfied by many plaintiffs even when there is proof of retaliatory animus. Finally, she criticized the majority’s use of comparison-based evidence as “the sole gateway through the probable-cause barrier that it otherwise erects.” This, in her view, will lead to arbitrary results and shield unconstitutional conduct: “a particularly brazen officer could arrest on transparently speech-based grounds and check the statute books later for a potential justification.”

Comments

1. Nieves posed this choice for the Court: protect police officers or protect the First Amendment. The Court chose to protect police officers. It thereby mangled both section 1983 and the First Amendment. Consequently, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor got it right: Mt. Healthy should have governed section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.

2. The decision in Nieves stems from the Court’s misguided decision in Hartman involving First Amendment retaliatory prosecutions. In Hartman the Court improperly inserted pro-law enforcement policy into section 1983 statutory interpretation in the course of setting out the proper elements of a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim. This set the stage for Nieves. As I have argued previously–see the post cited above–to the extent that such policy considerations are relevant, they belong on the qualified immunity side of section 1983 statutory interpretation (indeed, the Court has used qualified immunity with a vengeance to favor law enforcement). In this regard, note that the Court in Nieves explicitly cited Harlow v. Fitzgerald, where the Court eliminated the subjective part of the then-existing qualified immunity test in order to protect defendants from what it considered non-meritorious claims.

The Court in Nieves compounded its mistake by extending Hartman (where the presumption of prosecutorial regularity was the driving consideration) to Nieves and First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims, where this presumption simply does not play any role.

3. The “narrow qualification” somewhat helps plaintiffs bringing section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims. But the evidentiary burden of proof on plaintiffs to show similarly situated individuals who did not engage in protected speech and were not arrested, and plaintiffs’ ability thereby to end-run a finding of probable cause, is extremely high. Compare the onerous burden on section 1983 plaintiffs bringing claims of class-of-one equal protection violations.

4. Here are the results in real world terms:

(1) Going forward, the law regarding First Amendment retaliatory arrests is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes;

(2) Probable cause is a defense to section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims unless the plaintiff can show that he or she was treated differently from others similarly situated because of his or her speech.

(3) Probable cause is not a defense to a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim brought against a municipality whose official policy or custom brought about the plaintiff’s allegedly unconstitutional arrest. This is the teaching of Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, decided in 2018 and discussed in the post cited above as well as in Chapter 3 of my treatise, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2018, West).

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. — (2018), the Supreme Court once again avoided ruling generally on the question whether a section 1983 plaintiff who alleges a retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment must allege and prove the absence of probable cause in addition to impermissible First Amendment motive. Or, to put it another way, whether probable cause to arrest is a defense to a First Amendment retaliatory arrest damages claim. Instead, it ruled narrowly for the plaintiff based on the particular facts of his case.

In Lozman, the plaintiff alleged that a city (through its policymakers) had him arrested in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. He claimed that he was arrested at a city council meeting when he got up to speak because he previously had criticized the city’s eminent domain redevelopment efforts and had also sued the city for violating the state’s Sunshine Act. He was never prosecuted. However, the plaintiff conceded that there was probable cause for his arrest for violating a Florida statute prohibiting interruptions or disturbances at certain public assemblies, because he had refused to leave the podium after receiving a lawful order to do so.

Ordinarily, such a plaintiff, in order to make out a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, would only have to allege and prove that this impermissible retaliatory motive caused him harm, and the defendant would have the burden of disproving the absence of but-for causation in order to escape liability. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). But here the city argued that even if its motive was impermissible under the First Amendment, there was probable cause–an objective Fourth Amendment standard–to arrest the plaintiff anyway, and that this constituted a defense to the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

In Lozman, the Eleventh Circuit had ruled that probable cause was indeed a defense to a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. Specifically, it determined that a section 1983 retaliatory arrest plaintiff must allege and prove not only the retaliatory motive but the absence of probable cause as well. In other words, the absence of probable cause was an element of the section 1983 plaintiff’s retaliatory arrest claim.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Reliance on Hartman v. Moore

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartman v. Moore,  547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that for section 1983 retaliatory prosecution claims against law enforcement officers (prosecutors themselves are absolutely immune from damages liability for their decision to prosecute), the plaintiff must allege and prove not only the impermissible motive but the absence of probable cause as well. The Court reasoned that there was a presumption of prosecutorial regularity that the section 1983 plaintiff must overcome as an element of his retaliatory prosecution case. Accordingly, as a matter of section 1983 statutory interpretation and policy (but not of constitutional law), the plaintiff should have this twin burden in retaliatory prosecution cases.

The Court in Hartman explained that a retaliatory prosecution case was very different from the usual First Amendment retaliation case that involved a relatively clear causal connection between the defendant’s impermissible motivation and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. It was appropriate in such cases to apply the Mt. Healthy burden-shift rule under which the defendant has the burden of disproving but-for causation in order to prevail.

As discussed in a prior post, the Court previously had a similar First Amendment retaliatory arrest issue before it in Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012). But it avoided addressing the merits by ruling for the individual defendants on qualified immunity grounds.

In my view, as I have argued previously, the Court’s decision in Hartman should not be applied to First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases. The express reason for the Hartman rule is that First Amendment retaliatory prosecution cases involve a presumption of prosecutorial regularity. But this reason is clearly inapplicable where there is no prosecution and the constitutional challenge is to the arrest itself.

Moreover, First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims involve the impermissible motivation (a subjective inquiry) of law enforcement officers irrespective of probable cause, which is an objective (could have arrested) inquiry. Under this objective inquiry, the existence of probable cause precludes a Fourth Amendment violation based on an arrest even where that arrest is grounded on an offense different from the offense for which probable cause is deemed to be present. This provides a great deal of protection for police officers who allegedly make arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

However, if a police officer arrests a person for racial reasons, and the claimed injury is grounded on those racial reasons, it should not matter for the Equal Protection claim–-even if it would for a Fourth Amendment claim–-that the officer had probable cause to do so, namely, that the officer could have arrested the plaintiff. This reasoning should apply as well to §1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.

It was always questionable whether the Court in Hartman should have allowed policy considerations to change the usual section 1983 causation rules in First Amendment retaliatory prosecution cases. Regardless, that reasoning should most definitely not be extended to First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases. Such policy considerations as are discussed in Hartman are most appropriately addressed, if they are to be addressed at all, as part of the qualified immunity inquiry, not the elements of the section 1983 retaliatory arrest claim.

The Supreme Court’s Narrow Decision in Lozman

In any event, in Lozman, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, reversed the Eleventh Circuit and ruled that in this particular case the plaintiff did not have to allege and prove the absence of probable cause, and probable cause was not a defense to his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.

Emphasizing the narrowness of its decision, the Court pointed out that the plaintiff only challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under the First Amendment; he did not make an equal protection claim. Further, he conceded there was probable cause for his arrest, namely, that he could have been arrested for violating the Florida statute. Thus, the only question was whether the existence of probable cause barred his First Amendment retaliation claim in this case.

The Court went on to observe that the issue in First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases was whether Mt. Healthy or Hartman applied. It addressed what it considered to be the strong policy arguments on both sides of the issue. The Court then determined that resolution of the matter would have to wait for another case: “For Lozman’s claim is far afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claims, and the difficulties that might arise if Mt. Healthy is applied to the same mine run of arrests made by police officers are not present here.” For one thing, the plaintiff did not sue the officer who made the arrest. For another, since he sued the city, he had to allege and prove an official policy or custom, which “separates Lozman’s claim from the typical retaliatory arrest claim.” Moreover, the causation issues here were relatively straightforward because the plaintiff’s allegations of an official policy or custom of retaliation were unrelated to the criminal offense for which the arrest was made but rather to prior, protected speech. In short, the causal connection between the alleged animus and the injury would not be “weakened by [an official’s] legitimate consideration of speech.”(quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668).

This did not mean that the Lozman plaintiff would necessarily win on remand. A jury might find that the city did not have a retaliatory motive. Or, under Mt. Healthy, the city might show that it would have had the plaintiff arrested anyway regardless of any retaliatory motive.

Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter. He maintained that the Court had simply made up a narrow rule to fit this case. Instead, he argued that plaintiffs in First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases have the burden of pleading and proving the absence of probable cause. That is, probable cause “necessarily defeats First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claims.” Accordingly, the plaintiff should lose here.

Comments

The better approach, as indicated above, is to apply Mt. Healthy in all retaliatory arrest cases. Hartman should be limited to retaliatory prosecution cases. Nevertheless, after Lozman the question is still open in the Supreme Court. This means, among other things, the retaliatory arrest individual defendants will continue to have a powerful qualified immunity argument, namely, that the law is not clearly settled even now, per Reichle v. Howards.

Note, however, that the Court may yet resolve this question in its forthcoming 2018 Term. On June 28, 2018, it granted certiorari in Nieves v. Bartlett, 712 Fed.Appx. 613 (9th Cir. 2017)(No.17-1174), to address once again whether probable cause is a defense to a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. In this unreported decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled that probable cause is not a defense to First Amendment retaliatory arrest damages claims.

Suppose a section 1983 plaintiff alleges that a city had him arrested in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. He claims that he was arrested (although never prosecuted) at a city council meeting when he got up to speak because he previously had criticized the city’s eminent domain redevelopment efforts and had also sued the city for violating the state’s Sunshine Act.

Ordinarily, such a plaintiff, in order to make out a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, would only have to allege and prove that this impermissible retaliatory motive caused him harm, and the defendant would have the burden of disproving the absence of but-for causation in order to escape liability. But here the city argued that even if its motive was impermissible under the First Amendment, there was probable cause–an objective Fourth Amendment standard–to arrest the plaintiff anyway, and that this constituted a defense to the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. What result?

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 13, 2017, in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, No. 17-21, to deal with this very issue. In Lozman, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that probable cause is indeed a defense to a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. Specifically, that court determined that a section 1983 retaliatory arrest plaintiff must allege and prove not only the retaliatory motive but the absence of probable cause as well. In other words, the absence of probable cause is an element of the section 1983 plaintiff’s retaliatory arrest claim.

This decision was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartman v. Moore,  547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that for section 1983 retaliatory prosecution claims against law enforcement officers (prosecutors themselves are absolutely immune from damages liability for their decision to prosecute), the plaintiff must allege and prove not only the impermissible motive but the absence of probable cause as well. The Court reasoned that there was a presumption of prosecutorial regularity that the section 1983 plaintiff must overcome as an element of his retaliatory prosecution case. Accordingly, as a matter of section 1983 statutory interpretation and policy (but not of constitutional law), the plaintiff should have this twin burden in retaliatory prosecution cases.

The Court in Hartman explained that a retaliatory prosecution case was very different from the usual First Amendment retaliation case that involves a relatively clear causal connection between the defendant’s impermissible motivation and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. It was appropriate in such cases to apply the Mount Healthy burden-shift rule under which the defendant has the burden of disproving but-for causation in order to prevail.

As discussed in a prior post, the Court had this same First Amendment retaliatory arrest issue before it previously in Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012). But it avoided addressing the merits by ruling for the individual defendants on qualified immunity grounds. See https://nahmodlaw.com/2012/06/13/new-supreme-court-decision-reichle-v-howards-and-first-amendment-retaliatory-arrests/

Comment: The Court Should Reverse the Eleventh Circuit

In my view, the Court’s decision in Hartman should not be applied to First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases. The express reason for the Hartman rule is that First Amendment retaliatory prosecution cases involve a presumption of prosecutorial regularity. But this reason is clearly inapplicable where there is no prosecution and the constitutional challenge is to the arrest itself.

Moreover, First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims involve the impermissible motivation (a subjective inquiry) of law enforcement officers irrespective of probable cause, which is an objective inquiry. Under this objective inquiry, the existence of probable cause precludes a Fourth Amendment violation based on an arrest even where that arrest is grounded on an offense different from the offense for which probable cause is deemed to be present. This provides a great deal of protection for police officers who allegedly make arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, if a police officer arrests a person for racial reasons, and the claimed injury is grounded on those racial reasons, it should not matter for the Equal Protection claim–even if it would for a Fourth Amendment claim–that the officer had probable cause to do so. This reasoning should apply as well to section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.

It was always questionable whether the Court in Hartman should have allowed policy considerations to change the usual section 1983 causation rules in First Amendment retaliatory prosecution cases. Regardless, that reasoning should most definitely not be extended to First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases. Such policy considerations as are discussed in Hartman are most appropriately addressed, if they are to be addressed at all, as part of the qualified immunity inquiry, not the elements of the section 1983 retaliatory arrest claim.

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