The Sixth Circuit Provides a Primer on § 1983 Civil Conspiracies
The Sixth Circuit’s Rieves Decision
In Rieves v. Town of Smyrna, 67 F.4th 856, 863 (6th Cir. 2023), a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim was brought against city and county law enforcement agencies and their officials arising out of raids directed at the plaintiff CBD shop owner (and numerous other CBD shop owners as well) because they falsely believed that such shops violated state drug laws. According to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the county and its sheriff, there was sufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff did not have to prove an express agreement among the conspirators or show that each conspirator knew all the details of the plan; circumstantial evidence to establish an agreement was sufficient.
Further, there was no “personal involvement” requirement for a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim: it was enough that the county sheriff’s alleged behavior “reflects interdependent decision-making with [the city’s police department and the county’s district attorney’s office] through the planning and execution of Operation Candy Crush, all calculated to achieve an unconstitutional outcome.” The Sixth Circuit observed that its earlier decision in Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2015), “does not demand personal involvement by each co-conspirator in every wrongful or overt act to be held liable.”
The Sixth Circuit explained that the evidence showed that Operation Candy Crush “had an obviously illegitimate purpose, known by the co-conspirators, prior to the overt act. … [T]he scope of the operation was known and defined before the raids. …[And] the simultaneous nature of the raids indicates that they should be treated as parts of a single plan.” And because there was a genuine dispute regarding whether there was a single conspiratorial plan, the district court had erred in granting summary judgment to the county and its sheriff.
Comments
The Sixth Circuit got it right in terms of the legal principles governing § 1983 conspiracy claims. See my Treatise, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 §§ 2:23-2:26 (2025-26 ed.)(West/Westlaw). Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to establish an agreement. In addition, personal involvement of every co-conspirator in the wrongful or overt act is not required. Furthermore, not every co-conspirator has to know the precise details of the plan or even the identity of all participants in order to be liable.
I would add that a § 1983 conspiracy plaintiff must also allege and prove a constitutional deprivation; a mere conspiracy standing alone is not enough. However, the co-conspirators need not know that their agreement or conduct was unconstitutional: what is required is that they had an understanding, or made some concerted effort or had a plan, to cause harm to the plaintiff.
