Nahmod Law

It has been blackletter law since Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), and well before, that exhaustion of administrative remedies, like exhaustion of judicial remedies (see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 473 (1961)), is not required as a condition precedent to filing a § 1983 claim in federal court. Even though Patsy itself involved a § 1983 claim filed in federal court, the opinion made clear that this was a matter of § 1983 statutory interpretation. Thus, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, Patsy was almost universally understood as similarly applying to § 1983 claims filed in state court, just like the no-exhaustion of judicial remedies rule. Indeed, until recently, every state supreme court, except for that of South Dakota (in Reiff v. Avon School Dist., 458 N.W.2d 358 (S.D. 1990)), has ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for § 1983 claims filed in state court.

Now Alabama has joined with South Dakota and ruled the same way in Johnson v. Washington, 2023 WL 4281620 (S. Ct. Ala. 2023), cert granted sub nom Williams v. Washington, 144 S. Ct. — (2024)(No. 23-191), which will be argued in the Supreme Court’s 2024 Term.

In Williams, the plaintiffs filed unemployment compensation claims with the Alabama Department of Labor. Because these claims were not processed in a timely manner, the plaintiffs then filed suit under § 1983 seeking prospective relief and alleging that the defendants’ failure to act on their applications and provide the notices and hearings to which they were entitled violated their federal constitutional and Social Security Act rights. The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed plaintiffs’ amended complaint on the ground that state courts lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ § 1983 suit. The sole basis for the court’s dismissal was plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust the administrative appeals process governing unemployment compensation claims provided for by Alabama law. The Supreme Court of Alabama discussed Patsy, but nevertheless ruled that § 1983 plaintiffs could not “compel State courts to adjudicate federal claims that lie outside the State courts’ jurisdiction.”

As noted, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question “Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.”

Comments

1. A fair reading of Patsy makes abundantly clear that the Supreme Court was interpreting § 1983 when it rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “flexible” approach to exhaustion of administrative remedies. It emphasized § 1983’s legislative history as well as § 1997e of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act that showed Congress’s understanding of § 1983. It also rejected the various policy arguments presented in favor of an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.

2. Even though Alabama law does not discriminate against federal claims in its courts, its exhaustion of administrative remedies constitutes a severe burden on § 1983 claims and violates the Supremacy Clause for that reason alone. Compare Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), where the Court held that a Wisconsin four-month notice of claim statute that applied to suits against state and local government agencies and their officers in state courts could not be applied to § 1983 claims filed in state courts because it conflicted “in its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983 … [and would] predictably produce different outcomes … depending on whether the claims in asserted in state or federal court ….”

3. It is likely that what attracted four Justices to this case, thus leading to a grant of certiorari, is the issue as articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court: whether state courts can be compelled to decide federal claims purportedly outside of state courts’ jurisdiction. Significantly, the Court has already addressed this federalism issue in two cases.

In Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), the Court ruled unanimously that states cannot apply their sovereign immunity rules to bar § 1983 claims against local governments in state courts. The Court reasoned that under the Supremacy Clause state courts have coordinate authority and responsibility to enforce the supreme law of the land.

And in Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009), the Court struck down under the Supremacy Clause a New York statute, as applied to § 1983 claims, providing that New York courts did not have jurisdiction over any claims for damages against correctional officers sued in their personal capacities for acts committed within the scope of their employment. The Court emphasized that nondiscrimination standing alone was not the equivalent of neutrality.

Significantly, Justice Thomas dissented, making an originalist argument. Also dissenting, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito argued that the majority had misinterpreted the Court’s precedents. (Note that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito are still on the Court)

4. In light of the current understanding of § 1983 regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies, and under existing Supreme Court precedent dealing with federal claims in general, and § 1983 claims in particular, as they relate to state court jurisdiction, the Alabama Supreme Court got it wrong. Williams should therefore be reversed.

All of these cases, and more, are analyzed in Chapters 1 (“converse-Erie”) and 9 (exhaustion of administrative remedies) of my Treatise, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 (2023-24 ed.)(West/Westlaw).