The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides that prevailing plaintiffs in § 1983 and other civil rights cases (excluding prisoners who are separately covered by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995) are ordinarily entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee unless special circumstances render such an award unjust. So the threshold question is whether the plaintiff has prevailed.
Under § 1988, it has long been clear that a plaintiff who recovers damages or obtains meaningful injunctive relief is a prevailing plaintiff. See §§ 10:4-10:11 of my treatise, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2012)(CIVLIBLIT on Westlaw). But every so often federal courts need to be reminded of the obvious.
Lefemine v. Wideman, 81 U.S.L.W. 4005 (11-5-2012)(per curiam)
In this case, the Fourth Circuit held (PDF) that “a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction but no monetary damages was not a ‘prevailing party’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and so could not receive fees.” Reversing (PDF), the Supreme Court declared: “That was error [b]ecause the injunction ordered the defendant officials to change their behavior in a way that directly benefited the plaintiff.”
The plaintiff, an anti-abortion demonstrator who displayed signs with graphic pictures of aborted fetuses, sued county law enforcement officers under § 1983 and the First Amendment for nominal damages and declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with past and planned future demonstrations. The district court found that the defendants had previously violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. The district court also permanently enjoined the defendants from engaging in content-based discrimination based on the signs with the pictures. But the district court denied nominal damages on the ground that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. The district court further denied the plaintiff attorney’s fees based on “the totality of the facts,” and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the injunction did not alter the relationship between the parties, as required for prevailing party status. The plaintiff sought certiorari in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded, all without merits briefs and oral argument. According to the Court’s per curiam opinion, the plaintiff was clearly a prevailing party because he wanted to conduct demonstrations with signs that the defendants had told him he could not carry. He had sued in order to protect himself from the defendants’ threats against him, and he was successful. “[T]hat ruling worked the requisite material alteration in the parties’ relationship. … [A]fter the ruling, the police could not prevent him from demonstrating in that manner.”
Lefemine is an easy case. You have to wonder what the Fourth Circuit was thinking.
NOTE: THE BLOG IS ON BREAK UNTIL THE THIRD WEEK OF JANUARY, 2013, WHEN THE NEW SEMESTER BEGINS. ENJOY THE HOLIDAYS.
This is the third in the series and it addresses three myths about the Supreme Court with a minimum of legal jargon.
The First Myth. The Supreme Court’s primary function is to do justice.
Reality. The Supreme Court’s primary function is to interpret the Constitution and federal statutes. These interpretations become the supreme law of the land. The Court’s function is not necessarily to do justice in individual cases.
Of course, there are times when interpretations of particular constitutional provisions are considered by many to be just. For example, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits racial and other kinds of discrimination by government, is considered to be a just constitutional provision because it is based on the concept of equality.
Another example is the due process clause and its application in criminal cases. Due process has been interpreted to include concepts of justice and fairness so as to protect the rights of criminal defendants to an unbiased court, to confrontation and cross-examination, to be free from self-incrimination, to an attorney, and so on.
What is most important to remember, though, is that Supreme Court decisions are not necessarily just or moral. A Supreme Court decision can uphold an unjust federal or state law as constitutional. For example, the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson unfortunately upheld separate but equal in the racial setting at the end of the 19th century.
On the other hand, a Supreme Court decision can rule that a wise and just federal or state law is unconstitutional. For example, the Supreme Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison at the beginning of this century. Read the rest of this entry »
My post of November 12, 2012, on the structure of our government, was the first in a series called “Know Your Constitution.” This series is intended to educate citizens about the Constitution and the Supreme Court with a minimum of legal jargon.
This post, the second in the series, addresses two commonly and erroneously held beliefs, or myths, about the Constitution.
The First Myth The Constitution is a sacred document or is at least divinely inspired.
Reality The Constitution was written by human beings (all men at the time) and is a product of Enlightenment thinking. The Constitution exemplifies the application of reason to self-government. The divine right of kings is emphatically rejected by the Constitution.
Notice that there is no reference whatever in the Constitution to a divine being. Religion is mentioned only in several places. One place is the First Amendment with its Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Another place is the prohibition against religious tests for political office. In other words, religion has its role, but that role is not in government.
Along these lines, to characterize the Constitution as deeply influenced by Judaism and/or Christianity, as many like to do, is simply incorrect historically. Traditional Judaism and Christianity had nothing to say about democracy. Also, many of the Framers were deists who believed that a divine being created the universe and nature with its “laws” but then bowed out of human affairs. In contrast, theists believe that a divine being revealed itself and remains concerned with, and involved in, human affairs.
The Second Myth The Constitution, even if not divinely inspired, comes as close to being as perfect a document for self-government as is humanly possible.
Reality The Constitution is far from a perfect document.
The Framers were only human beings, although we are fortunate that they were very well educated, far-sighted and obsessed with forming a new kind of government that the world had never seen before. But they made mistakes. This is obvious if only because of the number of Constitutional Amendments that have been ratified—twenty-seven–including the Bill of Rights two years after the Constitution.
More seriously, the Constitution was almost fatally flawed from the beginning because of slavery. This word was never used in the Constitution—embarrassment, perhaps?–although there were three indirect references to it. I say “fatally flawed” because, as everyone knows, slavery led to the temporary breakup of the United States. It took an horrific Civil War and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to amend the Constitution and eliminate slavery once and for all. In a very real sense, the Civil War and these three Constitutional amendments finally brought the Constitution into line with the Declaration of Independence.
Next in the Series: Myths about the Supreme Court
Constitutional Education for Citizens
However, I’ve thought for a long time that we in the legal profession and the law schools do a mediocre job, at best, in educating the public about the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court.
What I would like to do in this and in occasional succeeding posts is try to explain, with a minimum of legal jargon, the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s role in interpreting it. Of necessity, these posts will be selective. I cannot cover everything.
What is Separation of Powers?
The first three articles of the Constitution create and set out the powers of the three branches of government.
First and foremost, Article I deals with Congress, the lawmaking branch, and its two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives. All legislation must be passed by both houses in order to become law. Congress may only act pursuant to its enumerated powers.
Second, Article II deals with the President, elected every four years, who enforces the law and thereby exercises executive powers. The President also has primary responsibility for foreign affairs except insofar as Congress is the branch that declares war. All legislation that is passed by both houses must go to the President for his approval.
Third, Article III creates the Supreme Court, the only non-politically accountable branch, in which is vested the judicial power to decide cases and controversies brought before it. Much more about this in later posts. Read the rest of this entry »
Persons Who Are Not “Persons”
The language of section 1983 makes “[e]very person” who deprives another of his or her constitutional rights under color of law potentially liable in damages.
On its face, section 1983 does not provide for any individual immunities. Moreover, the legislative history on this question is almost entirely lacking.
It turns out, nevertheless, that there are individuals who are not “persons” and who are absolutely immune from damages liability when sued in their individual capacities.
Three Categories of Absolutely Immune Individuals
There are three categories of absolutely immune defendants about which I will separately post later: state and local legislators, judges and prosecutors. But for now, I want to make the following introductory comments.
The Supreme Court’s Approach and Policy Considerations
Over the years the Supreme Court has developed the three categories of absolutely immune defendants by asking two questions.
First, what was the common law immunity background in 1871, when section 1983 was enacted? Second, if the 1871 common law provided for absolute immunity, is that consistent with the purposes of section 1983 in general?
The policy considerations specifically underlying absolute individual immunity are several. The core policy, though, is the promotion of independent decision-making without fear of either being sued (the costs of defending) or personal liability (the costs of liability). In other words, absolute immunity provides a wide margin for error for certain government officials whose functions are so very important that they should not be “chilled” at all when they make their legislative, judicial or prosecutorial decisions. Read the rest of this entry »
I previously blogged about affirmative action and the Equal Protection Clause on November 5, 2009. You might want to consult that post for general background: what affirmative action is and is not, the appropriate equal protection test and a survey of the cases.
My colleague, Professor Carolyn Shapiro, and I discussed the issues raised in Fisher on September 24, 2012, and had this discussion videotaped for The Oyez Project. I think you will find it of interest.
The Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine
What is the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and what role, if any, does it play in the § 1983 conspiracy setting?
In the words of the Eleventh Circuit in a § 1985(3) case, “under the doctrine, a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting within the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves.”McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000)(en banc).
(Mis?)Applying the Doctrine in a § 1983 Case: The Eleventh Circuit in Grider v. City of Auburn
Subsequently, in another Eleventh Circuit case, Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010), the plaintiff sued various city officials, including law enforcement officers, under § 1983, alleging that they maliciously conspired to prosecute him falsely for bribery. Even though the evidence showed that one of the officers was involved in the other’s bribery charge against the plaintiff, the court ruled that both officers could not be sued for an alleged § 1983 conspiracy because of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Read the rest of this entry »